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Introduction
BSTRACT 
nswer Set Programming (ASP) has become a popular and widespread paradigm for 
ractical Knowledge Representation thanks to its expressiveness and the available enhance­
ents of its input language. One of such enhancements is the use of aggregates, for 
hich different semantic proposais have been made. In this paper, we show that any 
SP aggregate interpreted under Gelfond and Zhang's (GZ) semantics c.an be replaced 
nder strong equivalence) by a propositional formula. Restricted to the original GZ 
ntax, the resulting formula is reducible to a disjunction of conjunctions of literais 
ut the formulation is still applicable even when the syntax is extended to allow for 
rbitrary formulas (including nested aggregates) in the condition. Once GZ-aggregates are 
presented as formulas, we establish a formai comparison ( in terms of the logic of Here­
nd-There) to Ferraris' (F) aggregates, which are defined by a different formula translation 
volving nested implications. ln particular, we prove that if we replace an F-aggregate 
y a GZ-aggregate in a rule head, we do not (ose answer sets (although more can be 
ained). This extends the previously known result that the opposite happens in rule bodies, 
e., replacing a GZ-aggregate by an F-aggregate in the body may yield more answer sets.
inally, we characterize a class of aggregates for which GZ- and F-semantics coïncide.
Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KRR) has constituted one of the central areas of Artificial Intelligence since its 
ry beginning and, in particular, logic-based approaches have attracted most of the interest in the literature. Although 
 This is an extended version of a conference paper at the 14th International Conference on logic Programming and Nonmonotonic Reasoning. Espoo, 
land, July 3-6, 2017, where it received a best technical paper award. 
Corresponding authors.
E-mail addresses: cabalar@udc.es (P. Cabalar), jorge.fandino@udc.es, jorge.fandinno@irit.fr U- Fandinno), torsten@cs.uni-potsdam.de (T. Schaub),
schell@cs.uni-potsdam.de (S. Schellhorn). 
 Panially supponed by grants GPC-ED431B 2016/035 and 2016-2019 ED431G/01 (Xunta de Galicia, Spain), and TIN 2013-42149-P, TIN 2017-84453-P
INECO, Spain). 
 Funded by the Centre International de Mathématiques et Informatique de Toulouse through contract ANR-11-LABEX-0040-0MI within the program 
R-11-IDEX-0002-02. 
 This work was panially funded by DFG gram SCHA 550/9. 
 Affiliated with the School of Computing Science at Simon Fraser University, Canada, and the lnstirute for Integrated and Intelligent Systems at Griffith 
iversity, Australia.
classical logic copes with many of the usual desiderata for KRR such as simplicity, clear semantics or well-known inference 
methods and their associated complexity, it was soon detected to fall short for practical purposes in different aspects. For 
instance, one crucial feature in many KRR scenarios, even in extremely simple ones, is the need to draw conclusions in 
absence of information, something impossible in classical logic due to its monotonic inference relation. As a result, since the 
introduction of the three well-known approaches, circumscription [1], default logic [2] and modal non-monotonic logics [3] in 
the historical special issue of the Artiﬁcial Intelligence journal in 1980, Non-Monotonic Reasoning (NMR) has centered great 
part of the discussion in KRR.
Nowadays, Answer Set Programming (ASP [4]) has become an established problem-solving paradigm and a prime candidate 
for practical KRR. The reasons for this success are manifold. The most obvious one is the availability of effective solvers [5,6] 
and a growing list of covered application domains [7]. A probably equally important reason is its declarative semantics, 
having been generalized from the original stable models [8] of  normal logic programs up to arbitrary ﬁrst-order [9,10] and 
inﬁnitary [11] formulas. Several logical characterizations of ASP have been obtained, among which Equilibrium Logic [12] and 
its monotonic basis, the intermediate logic of Here-and-There (HT), are arguably the most prominent ones. These general-
izations have allowed us to understand ASP as a general logical framework for NMR. Finally, a third relevant cause of ASP’s 
success lies in its ﬂexible speciﬁcation language [13], offering constructs especially useful for practical KRR. Some of its 
distinctive constructs are aggregates, allowing for operations on sets of elements such as counting the number of instances 
for which a formula holds, or adding all the integer values for some predicate argument. To understand the utility of this 
kind of constraints think about representing in ﬁrst-order logic, for instance, that predicate p is satisﬁed by at least n = 3 
different individuals. A typical formalization would look like:
∃x∃y∃z (p(x)∧ p(y)∧ p(z)∧ x = y ∧ y = z ∧ x = z)
This pattern becomes obviously cumbersome when increasing the number n of individuals, as the number of required 
inequalities combinatorially explodes. Moreover, the formula above cannot be constructed if n is an arbitrary parameter 
whose value is not known beforehand. On the other hand, this same meaning can be simply captured by a natural ASP 
aggregate of the form count{X : p(X)} ≥ n.
Unfortunately, there is no clear agreement on the expected behavior of aggregates in ASP, and several alternative 
seman-tics have been deﬁned [14–19], among which perhaps Ferraris’ [17] and Faber et al.’s [18] are  the two more 
consolidated ones due to their respective implementations in the ASP solvers clingo [5] and DLV [6]. Although these two 
approaches may differ when the aggregates are in the scope of default negation, they coincide for the rest of cases (like all 
the exam-ples in this paper), even when aggregates are involved in recursive deﬁnitions. Ferraris’ (F-)aggregates additionally 
show a remarkable feature: they can be expressed as propositional formulas in the logic of HT, something that greatly 
simpliﬁes their formal treatment. To illustrate this, let us explore the simple rule:
p(a) ← count{X : p(X)} ≥ n, (1)
where p(a) recursively depends on the number of atoms of the form p(X). Suppose ﬁrst that n = 1. Since the domain only 
contains a, count{X : p(X)} ≥  1 is  true iff p(a) holds. This is captured in Ferraris’ translation of (1) for  n = 1 that amounts 
to p(a) ← p(a), a tautology whose only stable model is ∅. Suppose now that n = 0. Then, the aggregate is considered as 
tautological and the HT-translation of (1) corresponds to p(a) ← 	  whose unique stable model is {p(a)}. Finally, as one 
more elaboration, assume n = 1 and suppose we add the fact p(b). Then, (1) becomes the formula p(a) ← p(a) ∨ p(b) that, 
together with fact p(b), is HT-equivalent to:
p(b). p(a) ← p(a). p(a) ← p(b). (2)
This results in the unique stable model {p(a), p(b)}.
Recently, Gelfond and Zhang [19] (GZ) proposed a more restrictive interpretation of recursive aggregates that imposes 
the so-called Vicious Circle Principle, namely, “no object or property can be introduced by the deﬁnition referring to the totality 
of objects satisfying this property.” According to this principle, if we have a program whose only deﬁnition for p(a) is (1), 
we may leave p(a) false, but we cannot be forced to derive its truth, since it depends on a set of atoms {X : p(X)} that 
includes p(a) itself. In this way, if n = 1, the GZ-stable model for (1) is also ∅, as there is no need to assume p(a). However, 
if we have n = 0, we cannot leave p(a) false any more (the rule would have a true body and a false head) and, at the 
same time, p(a) cannot become true because it depends on a vicious circle. Something similar happens for n = 1 when 
adding fact p(b). As shown in [20], GZ-programs are stronger than F-programs in the sense that, when they represent the 
same problem, any GZ-stable model is also an F-stable model, but the opposite may not hold (as we saw in the examples 
above). Without entering a discussion of which semantics is more intuitive or suitable for practical purposes, one objective 
disadvantage of GZ-aggregates is that they lacked a logical representation so far; they were exclusively deﬁned in terms of 
a reduct, something that made their formal analysis more limited and the comparison to F-aggregates more cumbersome.
In this paper, we show that, in fact, it is also possible to understand a GZ-aggregate as a propositional formula, classically 
equivalent to the F-aggregate translation, but with a different meaning in HT. For instance, the GZ-translation for (1) with 
n = 1 coincides with the F-encoding p(a) ← p(a), but if we change to n = 0 we get the formula p(a) ← p(a) ∨¬p(a) whose 
antecedent is valid in classical logic, but not in HT. In fact, the whole formula is HT-equivalent to the program:
p(a) ← p(a). p(a) ← ¬p(a).
This makes it now obvious that there is no stable model. Similarly, when we add fact p(b) and n = 1, the GZ-translation 
eventually leads to the propositional program:
p(b).
p(a) ← ¬p(a) ∧ p(b).
p(a) ← p(a) ∧ ¬p(b).
p(a) ← p(a) ∧ p(b). (3)
Again, it is classically equivalent to the F-translation (2), but quite different in logic programming, where the left rules 
enforce the non-existence of stable models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review some basic deﬁnitions that will be needed 
through the paper. In Section 3, we present a generalization of Ferraris’ reduct that covers GZ-aggregates and show that 
the latter can be replaced, under strong equivalence, by a propositional formula. In Section 4, we show that, in general, 
GZ-aggregates are stronger than F-aggregates in HT and, as a result, characterize the effect of replacing some occurrence of 
a GZ-aggregate by a corresponding F-aggregate. We also identify a family of aggregates in which both semantics coincide. 
In Section 5, we lift the fragment in which both semantics coincide to their ﬁrst-order languages: Alog and gringo [21]. 
Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Background
We begin by introducing some basic deﬁnitions used in the rest of the paper. Let L be some syntactic language and
assume we have a deﬁnition of stable model for any theory  ⊆ L in that syntax. Moreover, let SM() denote the stable 
models of . Two theories , ′ are strongly equivalent, written  ≡s ′ , iff SM( ∪ ) = SM(′ ∪ ) for any theory . We 
will provide a stronger deﬁnition of ≡s for expressions in L. Let (ϕ) denote some theory with a distinguished occurrence
of a subformula ϕ and let (ψ) be the result of replacing that occurrence ϕ by ψ in (ϕ). Two expressions ϕ,ψ ∈L are 
said to be strongly equivalent, also written ϕ ≡s ψ , when (ϕ) ≡s (ψ) for an arbitrary5 (ϕ) ⊆ L. We also recall next 
some basic deﬁnitions and results related to the logic of Here-and-There (HT). Let At be a set of ground atoms called the 
propositional signature. A propositional formula ϕ is deﬁned using the grammar:
ϕ ::= ⊥ | a | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ → ϕ for any a ∈ At.
We use Greek letters ϕ and ψ and their variants to stand for propositional formulas. We deﬁne the derived operators 
¬ϕ def= (ϕ → ⊥), ϕ ↔ ψ def= (ϕ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ) and 	 def= ¬⊥.
A classical interpretation T is a set of atoms T ⊆ At. We write |=cl to stand both for classical satisfaction and entailment, 
and ≡cl represents classical equivalence. An HT-interpretation is a pair 〈H, T 〉 of sets of atoms H ⊆ T ⊆ At.
Deﬁnition 1 (HT-satisfaction). An interpretation 〈H, T 〉 satisﬁes a formula ϕ , written 〈H, T 〉 |= ϕ , if any of the following 
recursive conditions holds:
• 〈H, T 〉 |= ⊥
• 〈H, T 〉 |= p iff p ∈ H, for any atom p
• 〈H, T 〉 |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff 〈H, T 〉 |= ϕ1 and 〈H, T 〉 |= ϕ2
• 〈H, T 〉 |= ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 iff 〈H, T 〉 |= ϕ1 or 〈H, T 〉 |= ϕ2
• 〈H, T 〉 |= ϕ1 → ϕ2 iff both:
(i) T |=cl ϕ1 → ϕ2 and
(ii) 〈H, T 〉 |= ϕ1 or 〈H, T 〉 |= ϕ2 
It is not diﬃcult to see that 〈T , T 〉 |= ϕ iff T |=cl ϕ . A (propositional) theory is a set of propositional formulas. An interpre-
tation 〈H, T 〉 is a model of a theory  when 〈H, T 〉 |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ . A theory  entails a formula ϕ , written  |= ϕ , when 
all models of  satisfy ϕ . Two theories , ′ are (HT)-equivalent, written  ≡ ′ , if they share the same set of models.
Deﬁnition 2 (Equilibrium/stable model). A total interpretation 〈T , T 〉 is an equilibrium model of a formula ϕ iff 〈T , T 〉 |= ϕ and 
there is no H ⊂ T such that 〈H, T 〉 |= ϕ . If so, we say that T is a stable model of ϕ . 
5 Note that, for arbitrary languages and semantics, this deﬁnition is stronger than usual, as it refers to any subformula replacement and not just conjunc-
tions of formulas, as usual. For instance, ϕ ≡s ψ also implies {ϕ ⊗ α} ≡s {ψ ⊗ α} for any binary operator ⊗ in our language. When L is a logical language 
and ≡s amounts to equivalence in HT (or any logic with substitution of equivalents) the distinction becomes irrelevant.
Proposition 1. The following are general properties of HT:
i) if 〈H, T 〉 |= ϕ then 〈T , T 〉 |= ϕ (i.e., T |=cl ϕ)
ii) 〈H, T 〉 |= ¬ϕ iff T |=cl ¬ϕ . 
Deﬁnition 3 (Ferraris’ reduct). The reduct of a formula ϕ with respect to an interpretation T , written ϕT , is deﬁned as:
ϕT
def=
⎧⎨
⎩
⊥ if T |=cl ϕ
a if ϕ is some atom a ∈ T
ϕT1 ⊗ ϕT2 if T |=cl ϕ and ϕ = (ϕ1 ⊗ ϕ2) for some ⊗ ∈ {∧,∨,→} 
That is, ϕT is the result of replacing by ⊥ each maximal subformula ψ of ϕ s.t. T |=cl ψ .
Proposition 2 (Lemma 1 in [22]). For any pair of interpretations H ⊆ T and any ϕ: H |=cl ϕT iff 〈H, T 〉 |= ϕ . 
As is well-known, strong equivalence for propositional formulas corresponds to HT-equivalence [23], that is, ϕ ≡s ψ iff 
ϕ ≡ ψ in that language. The following result follows from Corollary 3 in [24].
Proposition 3. If ϕ |= ψ and ϕ ≡cl ψ , then SM(ϕ) ⊇ SM(ψ). 
In other words, if ϕ is stronger than ψ in HT (and so, in classical logic too), but they further happen to be classically 
equivalent, then ϕ is weaker with respect to stable models. As an example, note that (p ∨ q) |= (¬p → q). As they are clas-
sically equivalent, SM(p ∨ q) ⊇ SM(¬p → q) which is not such a strong result. However, since HT-entailment is monotonic 
with respect to conjunction, it follows that (p ∨ q)∧ γ |= (¬p → q)∧ γ also holds for any γ , and thus, if we replace a dis-
junctive rule (p ∨q) by (¬p → q) in any program we may lose some stable models, but the remaining are still applicable to 
(p ∨ q). We can generalize this behavior not only on conjunctions, but also to cover the replacement of any subformula ϕ . 
We say that an occurrence ϕ of a formula is positive in a theory (ϕ) if the number of implications in (ϕ) containing 
occurrence ϕ in the antecedent is even. It is called negative otherwise.
Proposition 4. Let ϕ and ψ be two formulas satisfying ϕ |= ψ and ϕ ≡cl ψ . Then:
i) SM((ϕ)) ⊇ SM((ψ)) for any theory (ϕ) where occurrence ϕ is positive;
ii) SM((ϕ)) ⊆SM((ψ)) for any theory (ϕ) where occurrence ϕ is negative. 
Back to the example, note that (p ∨ q) occurs positively in (p ∨ q) ∧ γ and so, (¬p → q) ∧ γ has a subset of stable models. 
On the other hand, it occurs negatively in (p ∨ q) → γ , and so, (¬p → q) → γ has a superset of stable models.
3. Aggregates as formulas
To deal with aggregates, we consider a simpliﬁed ﬁrst-order6 signature  = 〈C,A,P〉 formed by three pairwise disjoint
sets respectively called constants, aggregate symbols and predicate symbols. An arithmetic term is a combination of numerical 
constants, variables and arithmetic operators built in the usual way. A term is either a constant c ∈ C , a variable X or an 
arithmetic term. We use the vector overline to represent tuples of terms, such as t , and write |t| to stand for the tuple’s 
arity. As usual, a predicate atom is an expression of the form p(t) where t is a tuple of terms; an arithmetic atom is an 
expression of the form t ≺ t′ with t and t′ arithmetic terms and ≺∈ {=, =,≤,≥,<,>} an arithmetic relation. A regular atom
is either a predicate atom or an arithmetic atom. An (aggregate) formula ϕ is recursively deﬁned by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= ⊥ | a | f { X :ϕ} ≺ t | f {c :ϕ, . . . ,c :ϕ} ≺ t | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ → ϕ
where a is regular atom, f ∈ A is an aggregate symbol, X is a non-empty tuple of variables, c is a non-empty tuple 
of constants, ≺∈ {=, =, ≤, ≥, <, >} is an arithmetic relation, and t is an arithmetic term. A (aggregate) theory is a set of 
aggregate formulas. As we can see, we distinguish two types of aggregates: f { X :ϕ} ≺ t called GZ-aggregates (or set atoms); 
and f {c1 :ϕ1, . . . ,cm :ϕm} ≺ t , with all ci of same arity, called F-aggregates. This syntactic distinction respects the original 
syntax7 also turns out to be convenient for comparison purposes, since we can assign a different semantics to each type 
of aggregate without ambiguity. An important observation is that, in our general language, it is possible to nest GZ and 
F-aggregates in a completely arbitrary way, since ϕ and ϕ1, . . . , ϕm inside brackets are aggregate formulas in their turn.
6 An extension to a full ﬁrst-order language is under development.
7 Ferraris actually uses ϕi = w rather than c :ϕ , but this is not a substantial difference, assuming w is the ﬁrst element in tuple c.
Achieving this generalization is not surprising, once aggregates can be seen as propositional formulas. A GZ-formula (resp. 
F-formula) is one in which all its aggregates are GZ-aggregates (resp. F-aggregates). We sometimes informally talk about
rules (resp. programs) instead of formulas (resp. theories) when the syntax coincides with the usual in logic programming.
The technical treatment of F-aggregates is directly extracted from [17], so the focus in this section is put on GZ-
aggregates, where our contribution lies. One of their distinctive features is the use of variables X . In fact, a formula ϕ
inside A = f { X :ϕ} ≺ t (called the condition of A) normally contains occurrences of X , so we usually write it as cond( X). 
Moreover, the occurrences of variables X in A are said to be bound to A. A variable occurrence X in a formula ϕ is free if 
it is not bound to any GZ-aggregate in ϕ . An atom is either a regular atom (predicate or arithmetic atom) or an aggregate. 
A (regular) literal is either a (regular) atom a (positive literal) or its default negation not a (negative literal). A predicate 
atom p(t) is said to be ground iff all its terms are constants t ⊆ C|t|; an arithmetic atom t ≺ t′ is said to be ground iff 
t and t′ are numbers; and an aggregate atom f {. . . } ≺ t is said to be ground iff it contains no free variables8 and t is a 
number. We write At(C, P) to stand for the set of ground atoms for predicates P and constants C . A theory is said to 
be ground iff all atoms occurring in it are ground. We deﬁne the grounding of a formula ϕ( X) with free variables X as 
expected: Gr(ϕ( X)) def= {ϕ(c) | c ∈ C| X |} where ϕ(c) is the result of replacing all occurrences of the variables X in ϕ( X)
by the constants in c and evaluating all arithmetic terms. Similarly, by Gr() def= ⋃{Gr(ϕ( X)) | ϕ( X) ∈ } we denote the 
grounding of any theory . Until Section 5, we will exclusively deal with ground theories. This is not a limitation, since a 
non-ground formula ϕ( X) in some theory can be understood as an abbreviation of its grounding Gr(ϕ( X)), as usual. Given 
a set of formulas S , we write 
∧
S and 
∨
S to stand for their conjunction and disjunction, respectively; we let 
∨∅ = ⊥ and ∧∅ = 	.
To deﬁne the semantics, we assume that for all aggregate symbols f ∈ A and arities m ≥ 1, there exists a predeﬁned 
associated partial function fˆm : 2Cm → Z that, for each set S of m-tuples of constants, either returns a number fˆm(S) or is 
undeﬁned. This predeﬁned value is the expected one for the usual aggregate functions sum, count, max, etc. For example, 
for aggregate symbol sum and arity m = 1 the function returns the aggregate addition when the set consists of (1-tuples 
of) integer numbers. For instance, ŝum1({7, 2, −4}) = 5 and ŝum1(∅) = 0 but ŝum1({7, a, 3, b}) is undeﬁned. For integer 
aggregate functions of arity m > 1, we assume that the aggregate is applied on the leftmost elements in the tuples when all 
of them are integer, so that, for instance, ŝum2({〈7, a〉, 〈2, b〉, 〈2, a〉}) = 11. We omit the arity when clear from the context.
A classical interpretation T is a set of ground atoms T ⊆ At(C, P).
Deﬁnition 4. A classical interpretation T satisﬁes a formula ϕ , denoted by T |=cl ϕ , when the following recursive conditions 
hold:
• T |=cl ⊥
• T |=cl p(c) iff p(c) ∈ T for any ground atom p(c)
• T |=cl f { X :cond( X)} ≺ n iff fˆ | X |
( { c ∈ C| X | | T |=cl cond(c) } )
has some value k ∈ Z and k ≺ n
under the usual meaning of
arithmetic relation ≺
• T |=cl f {c1 :ϕ1, . . . ,cm :ϕm} ≺ n iff fˆ |c1|
( { ci | T |=cl ϕi } )
has some value k ∈ Z and k ≺ n,
again, under its usual meaning
• T |=cl ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff T |=cl ϕ1 and T |=cl ϕ2
• T |=cl ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 iff T |=cl ϕ1 or T |=cl ϕ2
• T |=cl ϕ1 → ϕ2 iff T |=cl ϕ1 or T |=cl ϕ2
We say that T is a (classical) model of a theory  iff T |=cl ϕ for all ϕ ∈ . 
Given interpretation T , we divide any theory  into the two disjoint subsets:
+T
def= {ϕ ∈  | T |=cl ϕ} −T def=  \ +T
that is, the formulas in  satisﬁed by T and not satisﬁed by T , respectively. When set  is parametrized, say (z), we write 
+T (z) and 
−
T (z) instead of (z)
+
T and (z)
−
T . For instance, Gr
+
T (ϕ) collects the formulas from Gr(ϕ) satisﬁed by T .
Deﬁnition 5 (Reduct). We will deﬁne the reduct of a GZ-aggregate formula A = f { X :cond( X)} ≺ n with respect to a classical 
interpretation T , denoted as AT , in the following way:
8 Note that ground aggregates may still contain variables, but bound to the aggregate.
AT
def=
{⊥ |=if T cl A( ∧
Gr+T (cond( X))
)T
otherwise
The reduct of an F-aggregate B = f {c1 :ϕ1, . . . ,cm :ϕm} ≺ n is the formula:
BT
def=
{⊥ if T |=cl B
f {c1 :ϕT1 , . . . ,cm :ϕTm} ≺ n otherwise
The reduct of any other formula is just as in Deﬁnition 3. The reduct of a theory is the set of reducts of its formulas. 
Deﬁnition 6 (Stable model). A classical interpretation T is a stable model of a theory  iff T is a ⊆-minimal model of T . 
Note that, when restricted to F-formulas, Deﬁnition 3 exactly matches the reduct deﬁnition for aggregate theories by 
Ferraris [17]. On the other hand, when restricted to GZ-formulas, it generalizes the reduct deﬁnition by Gelfond–Zhang [19]
allowing arbitrary formulas in cond( X), including nested aggregates. For this reason, in our setting, the reduct is recursively 
applied to (
∧
Gr+T (cond( X)))T . In the original case [19], cond( X) was a conjunction of atoms, but it is straightforward to see 
that, then, (
∧
Gr+T (cond( X)))T =
∧
Gr+T (cond( X)). To sum up, the above deﬁnitions of stable model and reduct correspond
to the original ones for Ferraris [17] and Gelfond–Zhang [19] when restricted to their respective syntactic fragments.
Proposition 5. Stable models are classical models. 
Example 1. Let P1 be the program consisting of fact p(b) and rule (1) with n = 1, and let A1 be the GZ-aggregate in 
that rule. We show that P1 has no stable models. Given ground atoms p(a) and p(b), the only model of the program is 
T = {p(a), p(b)}, since p(b) is ﬁxed as a fact, and so, A1 must be true, so (1) entails p(a) too. Since T |=cl A1, the reduct 
becomes AT1 = p(a)∧ p(b), and so, P T1 contains the rules p(b) and p(a) ← p(a) ∧ p(b), their least model being {p(b)}, so T
is not stable. As another example of the aggregate reduct, if we took T = ∅, then T |=cl A1 and AT1 = ⊥. 
Example 2. As an example of nested GZ-aggregates, consider:
A2 = count
{
X : sum{Y : owns(X, Y )} ≥ 10 }≥ 2
and imagine that owns(X, Y ) means that X owns some item Y whose cost is also Y . Accordingly, A2 checks whether there 
are 2 or more persons X that own items for a total cost of at least 10. Suppose we have the interpretation:
T = {owns(a,6),owns(a,8),owns(b,2),owns(b,3),owns(c,12)}
Then A2 holds in T since both a and c have total values greater than 10: 14 for a and 12 for c. Therefore, AT2 corresponds 
to (
∧
Gr+T (sum{Y : owns(X, Y )} ≥ 10))T . After grounding free variable X , we obtain:
(sum{Y : owns(a, Y )} ≥ 10∧ sum{Y : owns(c, Y )} ≥ 10)T
Note that b does not occur, since its total sum is lower than 10 in T . If we apply again the reduct to the conjuncts above, 
we eventually obtain the conjunction: owns(a, 6) ∧ owns(a, 8) ∧ owns(c, 12). 
Proposition 6. Given formulas ϕ and ψ , the following conditions hold:
i) H |=cl ϕT implies T |=cl ϕ , and
ii) T |=cl ϕT iff T |=cl ϕ
for any pair of interpretations H ⊆ T . Furthermore, the following condition also holds
iii) if H |=cl ϕT iff H |=cl ψ T for all interpretations H ⊆ T , then ϕ and ψ are strongly equivalent, ϕ ≡s ψ . 
Proposition 6 generalizes results from [17] to our extended language combining GZ and F-aggregates. In particular, item 
iii) provides a suﬃcient condition for strong equivalence that, in the case of propositional formulas, amounts to HT-
equivalence.
We now move to consider propositional translations of aggregates. As said in the introduction, any F-aggregate can be 
understood as a propositional formula. Take any F-aggregate B = f {c1 :ϕ1, . . . , cm :ϕm} ≺ n where all formulas in {ϕ1, . . . , ϕm}
are propositional – moreover, let us call conds (the conditions) to this set of formulas. By 	[B], we denote the propositional 
formula:
	[B] def=
∧
T :T |=cl B
((∧
conds+T
)
→
(∨
conds−T
))
(4)
The following result directly follows from Proposition 12 in [17].
Proposition 7. For any F-aggregate B with propositional conditions, we have B ≡s 	[B]. 
Given an F-formula ϕ , we can deﬁne its (strongly equivalent) propositional translation 	[ϕ] as the result of the exhaus-
tive replacement of non-nested aggregates B by 	[B] until all aggregates are eventually removed.
Our main contribution is to provide an analogous propositional encoding for GZ-aggregates. To this aim, we extend 
translation 	 to be also applicable to any GZ-aggregate A = f { X :cond( X)} ≺ n with a propositional condition cond( X), so 
that 	[A] corresponds to the propositional formula:
	[A] def=
∨
T :T |=cl A
( ∧
Gr+T (cond( X))∧¬
∨
Gr−T (cond( X))
)
(5)
Proposition 8. For any GZ-aggregate A with a propositional condition, we have A ≡s 	[A]. 
This result allows us to deﬁne, for any arbitrary aggregate formula ϕ , its (strongly equivalent) propositional translation 
	[ϕ], again by exhaustive replacement of non-nested aggregates (now of any kind) C by their propositional formulas 	[C]. 
For any theory , its (strongly equivalent) propositional translation is deﬁned as 	[] def= {	[ϕ] | ϕ ∈ }.
Example 3. Take again the aggregate A1 in the body of rule (1) with n = 1 and assume we have constants a, b. The classical 
models of A1 are {p(a)}, {p(b)} and {p(a), p(b)}, since some atom p(X) must hold. As a result:
	[A1] = p(a)∧¬p(b) ∨ p(b)∧¬p(a) ∨ p(a)∧p(b)
and 	[(1)] amounts to the last three rules in (3). 
Example 4. Take GZ-aggregate A3 = count{X : p(X)} = 1 and assume we have constants C = {a, b, c}. The classical models 
of A3 are {p(a)}, {p(b)} and {p(c)}. Accordingly:
	[A3] =
p(a)∧¬(p(b)∨ p(c))
∨p(b)∧¬(p(a)∨ p(c))
∨p(c)∧¬(p(a)∨ p(b))
≡
p(a)∧¬p(b)∧¬p(c)
∨p(b)∧¬p(a)∧¬p(c)
∨p(c)∧¬p(a)∧¬p(b)
Theorem 1 (Main result). Any aggregate theory  is strongly equivalent to its propositional translation 	[], that is,  ≡s 	[]. 
4. Relation to Ferraris aggregates
In this section, we study the relation between GZ and F-aggregates. One ﬁrst observation is that GZ-aggregates are 
ﬁrst-order structures with quantiﬁed variables, while F-aggregates allow sets of propositional expressions. Encoding a GZ-
aggregate as an F-aggregate is easy: we can just ground the variables. The other direction, however, is not always possible, 
since the set of conditions in the F-aggregate may not have a regular representation in terms of variable substitutions. Given 
a GZ-aggregate A = f { X :cond( X)} ≺ n we deﬁne its corresponding F-aggregate F[A]:
F[A] def= f { c :cond(c) | cond(c) ∈ Gr(cond( X)) } ≺ n (6)
This correspondence is analogous to the process of instantiation used in [18] to ground aggregates with variables. It is easy 
to check that A and F[A] are classically equivalent. This can be checked using satisfaction from Deﬁnition 4 or classical logic 
for their propositional representations 	[A] ≡cl 	[F[A]]. Moreover, it can be observed that these two logical representations 
are somehow dual. Indeed, 	[F[A]] eventually amounts to:
	[F[A]] ≡
∧
T :T |=cl A
((∧
Gr+T (cond( X))
)
→
(∨
Gr−T (cond( X))
))
(7)
which is a conjunction of formulas like α → β for countermodels of A, whereas 	[A], formula (5), is a disjunction of 
formulas like α ∧ ¬β for models of A. Another interesting consequence of the classical equivalence of A and F[A] is that, 
due to Proposition 1-ii), we can safely replace one by another when negated. In other words:
Proposition 9. Let ϕ be a formula with some occurrence of a GZ-aggregate A and let ψ be the result of replacing A by its corresponding 
F-aggregate F[A] in ϕ . Then, we have that ¬ϕ ≡ ¬ψ . 
However, as we saw in the introduction examples, replacing some GZ-aggregate A by its F-aggregate version F[A] may
change the program semantics. Still, the stable models obtained after such replacement are not arbitrary. As we said, [20]
proved that if the GZ-aggregate A occurs in a positive rule body, then the replacement by the F-aggregate F[A] preserves 
the stable models, but may yield more. Next, we generalize this result to aggregate theories without nested GZ-aggregates. 
To this aim, we make use of the following proposition asserting that, indeed, 	[A] is stronger than 	[F[A]] in HT.
Proposition 10. For any GZ-aggregate A, 	[A] |=	[F[A]]. 
Theorem 2. For any occurrence A of a GZ-aggregate without nested aggregates:
i) SM((A)) ⊇ SM((F[A])) for any theory (A) where occurrence A is positive;
ii) SM((A)) ⊆ SM((F[A])) for any theory (A) where occurrence A is negative. 
Proof. From 	[A] ≡cl 	[F[A]] and Proposition 10 we directly apply Proposition 4. 
In particular, this means that if we replace a (non-nested) GZ-aggregate A by its F-version F[A] in the positive head 
of some rule, we still get stable models of the original program, but perhaps not all of them. Theorem 2 is not directly 
applicable to theories with nested aggregates because applying operator 	[ · ] produces a new formula in which nested 
aggregates may occur both positively and negatively.
It is well known that GZ and F-semantics do not agree even in the case of monotonic aggregates as illustrated by the 
example in the introduction. Nevertheless, we identify next a more restricted family of aggregates for which both semantics 
coincide.
Proposition 11. Any GZ-aggregate A of the following types satisﬁes A ≡s F[A]:
i) A = (count{ X : cond( X)} = n)
ii) A = (sum{X, Y : cond(X, Y )∧ X > 0} = n)
iii) A = (sum{X, Y : cond(X, Y )∧ X < 0} = n). 
Note that the result ii (resp. iii) of Proposition 11 does not apply if the condition X > 0 (resp. X < 0) is dropped. For 
instance, the program consisting of the rule
p(0) ← sum{X : p(X)} = 0 (8)
has a unique stable model {p(0)} under Ferraris’ semantic but no stable model under GZ’s one.
5. Relation between Alog and clingo aggregates
In this section, we restrict ourselves to the syntax of logic programming and lift the relation between GZ and F-aggregates
to their respective ﬁrst order languages, studying a syntactic fragment in which the semantics of Alog [19] and gringo [21]
coincide. We also show that every Alog program whose aggregates are all of count type can be easily rewritten to this 
fragment in a human friendly way. The same applies to program that also contain sum aggregates provided that 0 does 
not occur as a constant in the program. It is worth mentioning that a compilation for GZ-aggregates into F-aggregates has 
already been described in the literature [25]. This compilation has the advantage of covering programs containing any kind 
of aggregates. On the other hand, it makes uses of new auxiliary atoms that obscure the semantics of the program. In this 
sense, this compilation is better suited for automatic translation while our rewriting, though less general, preserves human 
readability.
An Alog rule is an expression of the form:
Head ← Pos∧ Neg ∧ Agg (9)
where Head is a disjunction of atoms, Pos is a conjunction of regular atoms, Neg is a conjunction of negative regular literals, 
and Agg is a conjunction of GZ-aggregates. An Alog program is a set of Alog rules. Recall that, in this section, we no longer 
assume that atoms or programs are ground. Note that every Alog program is also a program in the syntax of gringo, 
though their semantic may differ. We also recall the notion of global variable from [21]: a variable is said to be global
in a rule of the form of (9) iff it occurs in any literal in Pos or Neg or in any term t of any aggregate atom in Agg of 
the form f { X :cond( X)} ≺ t . An instance of a rule is obtained by replacing all global variables by constants. The gringo
grounding of logic program , denoted Grgringo(), is obtained by collecting all possible instances of its rules and replace 
every aggregate atom A by F[A]. A set of atoms T is a gringo stable model of a program  iff it is a stable model of 
Grgringo(). Note that notions of global and free variables do not coincide: an occurrence of a variable may be both global 
and bound. This implies that the Alog and gringo grounding of a program may be different and, as a result, the same 
program may have different stable models. To illustrate this fact, consider the following example from [19]:
Example 5. Let P2 consisting of the following rules
r ← count{X : p(X)} ≥ 2 ∧ q(X) (10)
p(a)
p(b)
q(a)
Variable X is both global in (10) and bound in count{X : p(X)} ≥ 2. As a result, the Alog grounding of P2 is obtained by 
replacing rule (10) by rules
r ← count{X : p(X)} ≥ 2 ∧ q(a)
r ← count{X : p(X)} ≥ 2 ∧ q(b)
On the other hand, its clingo grounding is obtained by replacing the same rule by
r ← count{a : p(a)} ≥ 2 ∧ q(a)
r ← count{b : p(b)} ≥ 2 ∧ q(b)
Both programs have a unique stable model, but a different one: {p(a), p(b), q(a), r} for the former and {p(a), p(b), q(a)} for 
the latter. 
We say that an aggregate atom is closed [26] iff no global variable occurs in it. We say that a rule (resp. program) is 
closed if all its aggregate atoms are closed. Then, from Proposition 11, we immediately get the following result for closed 
programs:
Proposition 12. Let  be a closed logic program where all aggregate atoms are of the form count{ X : cond( X)} = t. Then, the stable 
model of  with respect to Alog and gringo coincide. 
An interesting property of Alog is that we can rewrite any logic program as an equivalent closed program where all 
aggregate conditions are equalities.
Deﬁnition 7. Given a logic program , by tr1() we denote the result of replacing
i) every occurrence of a global variable that is also bound to some aggregate A by a same new fresh variable not occurring
anywhere else, and
ii) every aggregate f { X : cond( X, Y )} ≺ t with ≺ different from =, by the formula f { X : cond( X, Y )} = Z ∧ Z ≺ t with Z
also a new fresh variable not occurring anywhere else. 
Proposition 13. Given a logic program , the Alog stable models of  and tr1() coincide. 
From Proposition 12 and Proposition 13 it immediately follows that we can rewrite any Alog program where all aggre-
gates are of the type count into an equivalent one in which its stable models coincide with the gringo stable models.
Theorem 3. Given a logic program where all aggregate atoms are of the form count{ X : cond( X)} = t, then the Alog stable models 
of  coincide with the gringo stable models of tr1(). 
Example 6 (Ex. 5 continued). As mentioned above, P2 is a program whose stable models are different according to Alog and 
gringo semantics. On the other hand, we have that tr1(P2) is
r ← count{Y : p(Y )} = Z ∧ Z ≥ 2 ∧ q(X) (11)
p(a)
p(b)
q(a)
whose unique stable model is {p(a), p(b), q, r} according to both semantics. Recall that this is the unique stable model of 
P2 according to Alog. As a further example, let P3 be the logic program consisting of rule (1) with n = 1. Recall from the 
introduction that P3 has a unique stable model {p(a)} according to Ferraris semantics while it does not have any stable 
model semantics according to Gelfond and Zhang semantics. Note that, since this program is ground, gringo and Alog
semantics respectively coincide with Ferraris and Gelfond and Zhang semantics as described in Section 3. Furthermore, we 
have that tr1(P3) is
p(a) ← count{X : p(X)} = Z ∧ Z ≥ 0
which has no stable model under both semantics. 
Note that, in general, the rewriting tr1(·) is not safe for other kinds of aggregates with an associated function f for which 
there exist sets S and S ′ with S ⊂ S ′ such that f (S) = f (S ′). For instance, the sum of the empty set and the set {1, −1} is 
in both cases 0 and, as a result, we have that programs involving sum over these two sets will have different stable models.
Example 7. Let P4 be the logic program consisting of the following rules:
p(1) ← sum{X : p(X)} = 0 (12)
p(1) ← p(−1)
p(−1) ← p(1)
It is easy to check that tr1(P4) = P4, but this program has no stable model under the Alog semantics and has a unique 
stable model {p(1), p(−1)} under the gringo semantics. 
6. Conclusions
We have provided a (strong equivalence preserving) translation from logic programs with GZ-aggregates to propositional 
theories in Equilibrium Logic. Once we understand aggregates as propositional formulas, it is straightforward to extend the 
syntax to arbitrary nesting of aggregates (both GZ and F-aggregates) plus propositional connectives, something we called 
aggregate theories. We have provided two alternative semantics for these theories: one based on a direct, combined exten-
sion of GZ and F-reducts, and the other on a translation to propositional formulas. The propositional formula translation 
has helped us to characterize the effect (with respect to the obtained stable models) of replacing a GZ-aggregate by its 
corresponding F-aggregate. Moreover, we have been able to prove that both aggregates have the same behavior in the scope 
of negation. Finally, we identiﬁed a class of aggregates in which the GZ and F-semantics coincide. It is worth to mention 
that a propositional formula9 equivalent to Son and Pontelli aggregates was also given in [16]. We expect that the current 
propositional formula translations will open new possibilities to explore formal properties and potential implementations 
of both GZ and F-aggregates, possibly extending the idea of [20] to our general aggregate theories. Finally, an extension of 
the current approach to a full ﬁrst-order language with partial, evaluable functions (as those in [27]) was developed in [28]. 
This allows treating aggregates as ordinary ﬁrst-order terms and combine them with arbitrary predicates, not just arithmetic 
relations.
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4. First, note that ϕ ≡cl ψ implies (ϕ) ≡cl (ψ) due to substitution of equivalents in classical logic, 
regardless whether ϕ occurs positively or negatively in (ϕ). On the other hand, HT satisﬁes the Deduction Theorem, i.e., 
ϕ |= ψ iff ϕ → ψ is valid and, from the latter, we can derive the following intuitionistic consequences:
(ϕ ∧ γ ) → (ψ ∧ γ )
(ϕ ∨ γ ) → (ψ ∨ γ )
(γ → ϕ) → (γ → ψ)
(ψ → γ ) → (ϕ → γ )
which are also consequences in the intermediate logic of HT. As a result, if ϕ |= ψ , the above formulas hold and, together 
with ϕ ≡cl ψ , we can apply Proposition 3 to conclude:
9 This formula is classically equivalent to the ones for GZ and F-aggregates, but there is no pairwise HT-equivalence among the three of them.
SM(ϕ ∧ γ ) ⊇ SM(ψ ∧ γ )
SM(ϕ ∨ γ ) ⊇ SM(ψ ∨ γ )
SM(γ → ϕ) ⊇ SM(γ → ψ)
SM(ϕ → γ ) ⊆ SM(ψ → γ )
Finally, we can apply these relations by bottom-up structural induction on (ϕ) having in mind that, as we can see, each 
time we work with a subformula in an implication antecedent, the inclusion relation is reversed. If this happens an even 
number of times, the ﬁnal effect is canceled, and so SM((ϕ)) ⊇ SM((ψ)), since we started with SM(ϕ) ⊇ SM(ψ). Other-
wise, visiting an odd number of implication antecedents, we get SM((ϕ)) ⊆ SM((ψ)). 
Before proving Proposition 6, we introduce ﬁrst some auxiliary lemmas.
Lemma 1. Let H and T be two classical interpretations such that H ⊆ T and ϕ be a formula. Then, H |=cl ϕT implies T |=cl ϕ .
Proof. The proof is done by structural induction assuming the statement holds for every subformula of ϕ . Note that H |=cl
ϕT implies that the case ϕT = ⊥ is always disregarded.
Case 1: ϕ = a ground atom. Then
H |=cl aT iff (H |=cl a and a ∈ T ), and so, T |=cl a
Case 2: ϕ = A = f { X :cond( X)} ≺ n a GZ-aggregate. Then
H |=cl AT iff (H |=cl
(∧
Gr+T (cond( X))
)T
with T |=cl A). Thus, T |=cl A
Case 3: ϕ = B = f {c1 :ϕ1, . . . , cm :ϕm} ≺ n an F-aggregate. Then
H |=cl BT iff (H |=cl f {c1 :ϕT1 , . . . ,cm :ϕTm} ≺ n and T |=cl B)
and so, T |=cl B .
Case 4: In case that ϕ = (ϕ1 ⊗ ϕ2). By deﬁnition with ⊗ ∈ {∧, ∨, →},
H |=cl ϕT iff H |=cl (ϕ1 ⊗ ϕ2)T
iff H |=cl (ϕT1 ⊗ ϕT2 ) for T |=cl (ϕ1 ⊗ ϕ2)
which implies T |=cl ϕ 
Lemma 2. Any set of atoms T and formula ϕ satisfy: T |=cl ϕT iff T |=cl ϕ .
Proof. From Lemma 1 with H = T , it immediately follows that T |=cl ϕT implies T |=cl ϕ . We need to prove T |=cl ϕ implies 
T |=cl ϕT .
Case 1: ϕ = a ground atom. Then
T |=cl a iff a ∈ T implies aT = a implies T |=cl aT
Case 2: ϕ = A = f { X :cond( X)} ≺ n a GZ-aggregate. Then,
T |=cl A implies fˆ | X |
( { c ∈ C| X | | T |=cl cond(c) } )≺ n
and AT = (∧Gr+T (cond( X)))T
Furthermore, by induction hypothesis, T |=cl cond(c) implies that T |=cl cond(c)T for all c ∈ C| X | and, thus,
T |=cl
(∧{
cond(c)T ∣∣ c ∈ C| X | and T |=cl cond(c) })
implies T |=cl
(∧{
cond(c) ∣∣ c ∈ C| X | and T |=cl cond(c) })T
implies T |=cl
(∧{
ψ ∈ { cond(c) | c ∈ C| X | } ∣∣ T |=cl ψ })T
implies T |=cl
(∧{
ψ ∈ Gr(cond( X)) ∣∣ T |=cl ψ })T
implies T |=cl
(∧
Gr+T (cond( X))
)T
implies T |=cl AT
Case 3: ϕ = B = f {c1 :ϕ1, . . . , cm :ϕm} ≺ n an F-aggregate. Then
T |=cl B implies BT = f {c1 :ϕT1 , . . . ,cm :ϕTm} ≺ n and fˆ |c|
( { ci | T |=cl ϕi } )≺ n
implies T |=cl fˆ |c|
( { ci | T |=cl ϕTi } )≺ n
implies T |=cl f {c1 :ϕT1 , . . . ,cm :ϕTm} ≺ n
implies T |=cl BT
Case 4: In case that ϕ = (ϕ1 ⊗ ϕ2) with ⊗ ∈ {∧, ∨}. By induction, it follows
T |=cl (ϕ1 ⊗ ϕ2) implies (ϕ1 ⊗ ϕ2)T = (ϕT1 ⊗ ϕT2 ) and T |=cl (ϕT1 ⊗ ϕT2 )
implies T |=cl (ϕ1 ⊗ ϕ2)T
implies T |=cl ϕT
Case 5: In case that ϕ = (ϕ1 → ϕ2). By induction it follows
T |=cl (ϕ1 → ϕ2) implies ϕT = (ϕT1 → ϕT2 ) and either T |=cl ϕ1 or T |=cl ϕ2
implies ϕT = (ϕT1 → ϕT2 ) and either T |=cl ϕT1 or T |=cl ϕT2
implies ϕT = (ϕT1 → ϕT2 ) and T |=cl ϕT1 → ϕT2
implies T |=cl ϕT 
For formulas ϕ and ψ , let us write ϕ ⇔ ψ when the following condition holds: H |=cl ϕT iff H |=cl ψ T for all interpretations 
H ⊆ T .
Lemma 3. Let ψ and ψ ′ be a pair of formulas whose unique difference is that some subformula ϕ of ψ is replaced by another subfor-
mula ϕ′ in ψ ′ . If ϕ ⇔ ϕ′ then ψ ⇔ ψ ′ .
Proof. The proof follows by structural induction assuming the statement holds for all subformulas of ψ .
Case 1: ψ = a ground atom, then the only (sub-)formula of ψ is ψ itself. Thus either both ψ = ϕ and ψ ′ = ϕ′ or ψ = ψ ′ . In 
both cases ψ ⇔ ψ ′ .
In the following holds, if ψ = ϕ and ψ ′ = ϕ′ then the assertion is trivial.
Case 2: ψ = f { X :cond( X)} ≺ n is a GZ-aggregate.
Then, ψ ′ = f { X :cond′( X)} ≺ n and, by induction hypothesis cond(X) ⇔ cond′(X) holds. Furthermore, from Lemma 2, this 
implies that cond(c) ≡cl cond′(c). Then,
H |=cl ψ T iff H |=cl
∧
{ cond(c)T | T |=cl cond(c) with c ∈ C X } and T |=cl ψ
iff H |=cl
∧
{ cond′(c)T | T |=cl cond′(c) with c ∈ C X } and T |=cl ψ ′
iff H |=cl (ψ ′)T
That is, ψ ⇔ ψ ′ .
Case 3: ψ = f {c1 :ϕ1, . . . ,cm :ϕm} ≺ n an F-aggregate.
Then, ψ ′ = f {c1 :ϕ′1, . . . , cm :ϕ′m} ≺ n with ϕi ⇔ ϕ′i for all i by induction hypothesis. Then,
H |=cl ψ T iff H |=cl f {c1 :ϕT1 , . . . ,cm :ϕTm} ≺ n and T |=cl ψ
iff H |=cl f {c1 :(ϕ′1)T , . . . ,cm :(ϕ′m)T } ≺ n and T |=cl ψ ′
iff H |=cl (ψ ′)T
That is, ψ ⇔ ψ ′ .
Case 4: If ψ = ϕ1 ⊗ ϕ2 for ⊗ ∈ {∧, ∨, →}, then ψ ′ = ϕ′1 ⊗ ϕ′2 with ϕ′i ⇔ ϕ′i holds, by induction hypothesis. Then,
H |=cl ψ T iff H |=cl ϕT1 ⊗ ϕT2 and T |=cl ψ
iff H |=cl (ϕ′1)T ⊗ (ϕ′2)T and T |=cl ψ ′
iff H |=cl (ψ ′)T
That is, ψ ⇔ ψ ′ . 
Proof of Proposition 6. The proof follows directly from the above auxiliary Lemmas: i) from Lemma 1, ii) from Lemma 2
and iii) from Lemma 3. In particular, for iii), note that, if we take a theory (ϕ) with a distinguished occurrence of ϕ , 
we can separate the formula γ ∈ (ϕ) containing that particular occurrence of ϕ and deﬁne all the rest as ′ = (ϕ)\{γ }. 
Then, (ψ) = ′ ∪ {γ ′} where γ ′ is obtained from γ by replacing some occurrence of ϕ by ψ and, from Lemma 3, and 
the fact H |=cl ϕT iff H |=cl ψ T for all interpretations H ⊆ T it follows that H |=cl γ T iff H |=cl (γ ′)T . As a result, it is clear 
that, for any context theory , H |=cl ((ϕ) ∪ )T iff H |=cl ((ψ) ∪ )T for all H ⊆ T which, by deﬁnition, implies that 
SM((ϕ) ∪) = SM((ψ) ∪) and ϕ ≡s ψ . 
Proof of Proposition 7. From Proposition 12 in [17], it follows that BT ≡cl 	[B]T for any interpretation T . Thus, the result 
follows directly from Proposition 6. 
Proof of Proposition 8. Note that, from Proposition 6, if H |=cl AT iff H |=cl 	[A]T holds then A ≡s 	[A] holds. Hence, it is 
enough to show H |=cl AT iff H |=cl 	[A]T .
Let us show that H |=cl AT implies H |=cl 	[A]T for any pair of classical interpretations such that H ⊆ T . Note that 
T |=cl A implies that AT = ⊥ and, thus, H |=cl AT and the statement holds vacuously.
Then, we may assume without loss of generality that T |=cl A and, thus, to show that H |=cl 	[A]T , it is enough to show 
that the following two conditions hold:
(a) H |=cl cond(c)T for every c ∈ C X s.t. T |=cl cond(c), and
(b) H |=cl (¬cond(c))T for every c ∈ C X s.t. T |=cl cond(c)
Furthermore, by deﬁnition, T |=cl A implies
AT =
∧
{ cond(c)T | T |=cl cond(c) with c ∈ C X } (A.1)
and, thus, H |=cl AT implies that (a) holds. Moreover, T |=cl cond(c) implies cond(c)T = ⊥ which, in its turn, implies H |=cl
(¬cond(c))T and, thus, (b) follows.
The other way around. Assume that H |=cl 	[A]T . Then, there is I |=cl A satisfying the following two conditions:
(c) H |=cl cond(c)T for every c ∈ C X such that I |=cl cond(c), and
(d) H |=cl (¬cond(c))T for every c ∈ C X such that I |=cl cond(c)
From Proposition 6 and the fact that H ⊆ T , it follows that H |=cl cond(c)T implies that T |=cl cond(c) and, thus, (c) implies
(c’) T |=cl cond(c) for every c ∈ C X s.t. I |=cl cond(c)
Similarly, H |=cl (¬cond(c))T implies T |=cl (¬cond(c)) which, in its turn, implies that T |=cl cond(c). Thus, (d) implies
(d’) T |=cl cond(c) for every c ∈ C X such that I |=cl cond(c)
From (c’) and (d’), it follows that
(e) T |=cl cond(c) iff I |=cl cond(c) holds for every c ∈ C X
In its turn, this implies that T |=cl A iff I |=cl A and, since I |=cl A, it follows that T |=cl A and, thus, we have that (A.1) holds 
(note that T |=cl A would imply that AT = ⊥). Then, to show that H |=cl AT is enough to show that H |=cl cond(c)T for every 
c ∈ C X such that T |= cond(c) which follows from (c) and (e). 
For the following proofs, we need the following notation: given any formula ϕ , by  ϕ  
def= { I | I |=cl ϕ } we denote the 
set of all propositional interpretation that satisfy ϕ .
Proof of Proposition 10. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there are some HT-interpretations such that 
〈H, T 〉 |= 	[A], but 〈H, T 〉 |= 	[F[A]]. Note that 〈H, T 〉 |= 	[A] implies that there is some I ∈  A  satisfying the follow-
ing two conditions:
(a) 〈H, T 〉 |= cond(c) for all c ∈ C| X | s.t. I |= cond(c),
(b) 〈H, T 〉 |= ¬cond(c) for all c ∈ C| X | s.t. I |= cond(c)
Furthermore, 〈H, T 〉 |= cond(c) and 〈H, T 〉 |= ¬cond(c) respectively imply that T |= cond(c) and T |= cond(c). In its turn, this 
implies that T |= cond(c) iff I |= cond(c) for all c ∈ C| X | which, since I ∈  A  holds, implies that T ∈  A  holds, too. Note 
that, since T ∈  A , every J /∈  A  must satisfy one of the following conditions hold:
(c) T |= cond(c) and J |= cond(c) for some c ∈ C| X | , or
(d) T |= cond(c) and J |= cond(c) for some c ∈ C| X |
Furthermore, 〈H, T 〉 |= 	[F[A]] implies that there is some J /∈  A  such that 〈H, T 〉 |= ψ with ψ = (ψ1 → ψ2) and
ψ1
def=
(∧
Gr+J (A)
)
ψ2
def=
(∨
Gr−J (A)
)
Hence, either T |= ψ or both 〈H, T 〉 |= ψ1 and 〈H, T 〉 |= ψ2. If we assume that T |= ψ , there must be some J /∈  A  that 
satisﬁes the following conditions:
(e) T |= cond(c) for all c ∈ C| X | s.t. J |= cond(c),
(f) T |= cond(c) for all c ∈ C| X | s.t. J |= cond(c)
plus (c) and (d), which is a contradiction. Consequently, it must be that both 〈H, T 〉 |= ψ1 and 〈H, T 〉 |= ψ2, but this implies 
that the following condition holds:
(g) 〈H, T 〉 |= cond(c) for all c ∈ C| X | s.t. J |= cond(c),
(h) 〈H, T 〉 |= cond(c) for all c ∈ C| X | s.t. J |= cond(c)
Then, since T ∈  A  and J /∈  A , one of the following conditions must hold
(i) I |= cond(c) and J |= cond(c) for some c ∈ C| X |
(j) I |= cond(c) and J |= cond(c) for some c ∈ C| X |
If the former, (a) and (h), respectively imply that both, 〈H, T 〉 |= cond(c) and 〈H, T 〉 |= cond(c), must hold, which is a 
contradiction. Otherwise, the latter plus (b) and (g) respectively imply that 〈H, T 〉 |= ¬cond(c) and 〈H, T 〉 |= cond(c) hold, 
which is also a contradiction. 
For proving Proposition 11, we need to introduce the following notation and some auxiliary results. Let ≺ denote any 
relation symbol. We say that A = ( f { X :cond( X)} ≺ n) is monotone (resp. antimonotone) iff fˆ (W1) ≺ n implies fˆ (W2) ≺ n
for all sets of tuples W1 ⊆ W2 ⊆ C| X | (resp. W2 ⊆ W1 ⊆ C| X |). It is regular iff for any pair W1, W2 of sets of tuples of 
constants s.t. W1 ⊂ W2 satisﬁes that either fˆ (W1) ⊀ n or fˆ (W2) ⊀ n. Furthermore, by A≥ we denote the GZ-aggregate 
f ≥{X :cond( X)} ≥ n “testing” the greater or equal relation, that is, its function fˆ ≥ is deﬁned so that fˆ ≥(W ) ≥ n iff there is
some W ′ ⊇ W such that fˆ (W ′) ≺ n. Analogously, A≤ stands for f ≤{X :cond( X)} ≤ n whose function fˆ ≤ is deﬁned so that 
fˆ ≤(W ) ≤ n iff there is W ′ ⊆ W such that fˆ (W ) ≺ n. Then, by 	D[A], we denote the following formula:∧
T /∈ A≤ 
(
¬
∧
Gr+T (cond( X))
)
∧
∧
T /∈ A≥ 
(∨
Gr−T (cond( X))
)
(A.2)
Lemma 4. Let A be a regular aggregate. Then,  A  =  A≥  ∩  A≤ . 
Proof. By deﬁnition, it is clear that  A  ⊆  A≥  ∩  A≤ . The other way around. Let I ∈  A≥  ∩  A≤ . Then, there are 
W1 ⊆ WI ⊆ W2 such that fˆ (W1) ≺ n and fˆ (W2) ≺ n. Furthermore, since A is regular, if either W1 ⊂ WI or WI ⊂ W2 hold, 
then either fˆ (W1) ⊀ n and fˆ (W2) ⊀ n must hold too. Therefore, W1 = WI = W2 and I ∈  A  hold. 
Lemma 5. Any regular F-aggregate B with condition ϕ satisﬁes:
i) aggregates B≥ and B≤ are respectively monotone and antimonotone
ii) T |=cl B iff T |=cl B≥ ∧ B≤
iii) 	[B] ≡s 	[B≥] ∧	[B≤] ≡s 	D[B].
Proof. Conditions i) and ii) directly follow from deﬁnition and Lemma 4, respectively. Then, since B≥ is monotone and B≤
is antimonotone, from Proposition 13 in [17], it follows that
	[B≥] ≡s
∧
I /∈ B≥ 
(∨
Gr−I (ϕ)
)
	[B≤] ≡s
∧
I /∈ B≤ 
(
¬
∧
Gr+I (ϕ)
)
Furthermore, since  B  =  B≤  ∩  B≥ , it follows that I /∈  A  iff either I /∈  B≥  or I /∈  B≤ . Hence, we have that 
	[B≥] ∧	[B≤] ≡s 	D[B]. Moreover, we have that
	[B] =
∧
I /∈ B 
((∧
Gr+I (ϕ)
)
→
(∨
Gr−I (ϕ)
))
≡
∧
I /∈ B≥ 
((∧
Gr+I (ϕ)
)
→
(∨
Gr−I (ϕ)
))
∧
∧
I /∈ B≤ 
((∧
Gr+I (ϕ)
)
→
(∨
Gr−I (ϕ)
))
= 	[B≥] ∧	[B≤]
Consequently, 	[B] ≡s 	[B≥] ∧	[B≤] ≡s 	D[B] holds. 
For A = f { X :cond( X)} ≺ n, we deﬁne W 〈H,T 〉(A) def= {c | 〈H, T 〉 |= cond(c)}. We also use WT (A) to stand for W 〈T ,T 〉(A).
Lemma 6. Any GZ-aggregate A = f { X :cond( X)} ≺ c with propositional cond( X) satisﬁes that the following three conditions are 
equivalent
i) 〈H, T 〉 |= 	[F[A]]
ii) H |=cl F[A]T
iii) fˆ (W 〈H,T 〉(A)) ≺ n and fˆ (WT (A)) ≺ n. 
Proof. Let us ﬁrst prove that condition ii) holds iff iii) holds. In case that T |=cl A, it follows that AT = ⊥ and T |=cl
	[A] which, in their turn, respectively imply that H |=cl F[A]T and fˆ (WT (A)) ⊀ n. Hence, we may assume without loss of 
generality that T |=cl A and, thus, that fˆ (WT (A)) ≺ n holds.
H |=cl F[A]T iff H |=cl f {c1 :ϕT1 , . . . ,cm :ϕTm} ≺ n
iff fˆ { ci | H |=cl ϕTi } ≺ n
iff fˆ ({ ci | 〈H, T 〉 |=cl ϕi }) ≺ n
iff fˆ (W 〈H,T 〉) ≺ n
Recall that, by Proposition 3 in [17], it follows that any propositional formula ϕ satisﬁes: H |=cl ϕT iff 〈H, T 〉 |=cl ϕ . This 
also implies that conditions i) and ii) are equivalent and, thus, the statement holds. 
Lemma 7. Any regular GZ-aggregate A satisﬁes: 	[F[A]] |= 	[A]. 
Proof. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there is some HT-interpretation such that 〈H, T 〉 |= 	[F[A]], but 
〈H, T 〉 |= 	[A]. Suppose also that T |=cl A. Then, from 〈H, T 〉 |= 	[A], it follows that one of the following conditions must 
hold
(a) 〈H, T 〉 |= cond(c) for some c ∈ C| X | s.t. T |=cl cond(c),
(b) 〈H, T 〉 |= ¬cond(c) for some c ∈ C| X | s.t. T |=cl cond(c)
On the one hand, 〈H, T 〉 |= ¬cond(c) implies T |=cl ¬cond(c) which, in its turn, implies T |=cl cond(c). Thus, (b) is a contra-
diction. On the other hand, from Proposition 1, it follows that W 〈H,T 〉 ⊆ WT holds for any HT-interpretation 〈H, T 〉. Then, (a)
implies that W 〈H,T 〉 ⊂ WT which, since A is regular, implies that either fˆ (W 〈H,T 〉) ⊀ n or fˆ (WT ) ⊀ n hold. If the former, 
then 〈H, T 〉 |= 	[F[A]] (Lemma 6) which is a contradiction with the assumption 〈H, T 〉 |= 	[F[A]]. If the latter, we have that 
T |=cl A and A ≡cl 	[A] and T |=cl 	[A], which is a contradiction with the facts T |=cl 	[F[A]] (because 〈H, T 〉 |= 	[F[A]]) 
and 	[A] ≡cl 	[F[A]]. Hence, it must be that T |= A and, thus, Lemma 5, implies:
(c) either T |= A≥ or T |= A≤ , and
(d) 〈H, T 〉 |= 	[F[A]] and 	[F[A]] ≡s 	D[F[A]] and, thus, 〈H, T 〉 |= 	D[F[A]].
In its turn, these conditions imply that one of the following two contradictions must hold:
(e) 〈H, T 〉 |= ¬cond(c) for some c ∈ C| X | s.t. T |= cond(c) (if T |= A≤)
(f) 〈H, T 〉 |= cond(c) for some c ∈ C| X | s.t. T |= cond(c) (if T |= A≥)
Consequently, 〈H, T 〉 |= 	[F[A]] implies 〈H, T 〉 |= 	[A]. 
Proof of Proposition 11. If A is regular, from Proposition 10 and Lemma 7, it respectively follows 	[A] |= 	[F[A]]
and 	[F[A]] |= 	[A]. Thus, 	[A] ≡s 	[F[A]]. Hence, it only remains to be proved that A is regular in these cases. 
For that, note that ĉount(W1) < ĉount(W2) for all W1 ⊂ W2 and, thus, count{ X :cond( X)} = n is regular. Simi-
larly, if there is no c ∈ C such that c ≤ 0 (resp. c ≥ 0), then ŝum(W1) < ŝum(W2) (resp. ŝum(W1) > ŝum(W2)), so 
A = (sum{X, Y : cond(X, Y )∧ X > 0} = n) (resp. A = (sum{X, Y : cond(X, Y )∧ X < 0} = n)) is also regular. Therefore, we con-
clude that 	[A] ≡s 	[F[A]] holds. Finally, note that we have A ≡s 	[A] (Proposition 8) and F[A] ≡s 	[F[A]] (Proposition 7) 
and, thus, we obtain that the equivalence A ≡s F[A] holds. 
Proof of Proposition 12. Since  is closed, the set of all instances of any rule r coincide with Gr(r). Hence, for any 
ground rule r′ ∈ Gr() there is a rule r′′ ∈ Grgringo() which is the result of replacing every aggregate atom A by F[A], 
and vice-versa. From Proposition 11, we have that r′ ≡s r′′ and, thus, that the stable models of Gr() and Grgringo()
coincide. 
Lemma 8. Any GZ-aggregate A = ( f { X :cond( X)} ≺ n) satisﬁes:
A ≡s
( ∨
m∈Z
( f { X :cond( X)} =m)∧ (m ≺ n)
)
Proof. Let ϕ refer to the right hand side of the above equivalence. Then, assume that T |=cl A. This implies that AT = ⊥
and, it is clear that H |=cl AT for all set of atoms H ⊆ T . Furthermore, T |=cl A implies that:
fˆ | X |
( { c ∈ C| X | | T |=cl cond(c) } )= k
with k ∈ Z, k ⊀ n and the usual meaning of ≺. Hence, for all m ∈ Z, it follows that either T |=cl ( f { X :cond( X)} =m) (case 
that m = k) or T |=cl (m ≺ n) (case that m = k). Hence, T |=cl ϕ and, thus, it follows that ϕT = ⊥ and H |=cl ϕT for any set 
of atoms H . That is, for all set of atoms H ⊆ T , we have that both H |=cl AT and H |=cl ϕT hold. From condition iii) in 
Proposition 6, this implies that A ≡s ϕ .
Thus, we may assume without loss of generality that T |=cl A. That is, that we have that fˆ | X |
( {c ∈ C| X | | T |=cl
cond(c)} ) = k with k ∈ Z and k ≺ n and the usual meaning of the relation ≺. Furthermore, this implies that T |=cl ϕ and, 
thus, that
ϕT ≡cl
∨
m∈Z
( f { X :cond( X)} =m)T ∧ (m ≺ n)T
≡cl
∨
m≺n
( f { X :cond( X)} =m)T
≡cl
∨
m≺n
m =k
( f { X :cond( X)} =m)T ∨ ( f { X :cond( X)} = k)T
≡cl
∨
m≺n
m =k
⊥∨ ( f { X :cond( X)} = k)T
≡cl ( f { X :cond( X)} = k)T
Since T |=cl A and T |=cl ( f { X :cond( X)} = k)T , it follows
AT = ( ∧Gr+T (cond( X)) )T = ( f { X :cond( X)} = k)T
Then, for all set H ⊆ At, it follows that:
H |=cl ϕT iff H |=cl ( f { X :cond( X)} = k)T iff H |=cl AT . 
Proof of Proposition 13. First note that replacing bound variables does not change the semantics of a logic program with 
respect to Alog. Hence, we may assume without loss of generality that  is a closed logic program and we will show that 
step ii) of Deﬁnition 7 does not change the semantics of the program either.
Let r(Y ) be some rule of the form
Head(Y ) ← Pos(Y )∧ Neg(Y )∧ Agg(Y )
with free variables Y and let A = ( f { X : cond( X, Y )} ≺ t) be some aggregate in Agg. Let Agg′ be the conjunction of all 
aggregates in Agg but for A, let A′ = f { X : cond( X, Y )} = Z ∧ Z ≺ t with Z a fresh variable not occurring anywhere else, and 
let r′(Y , Z) be the rule
Head(Y ) ← Pos(Y )∧ Neg(Y )∧ Agg′(Y )∧ A′(Y , Z)
We will show that Gr(r(Y )) ≡s Gr(r′(Y , Z)). First, we note that
Gr(r(Y )) = {r(c) | c ∈ C| Y |}
and
Gr(r′(Y , Z)) = {r′(c,d) | c ∈ C| Y | and d ∈ C}
Let S(r(c)) def= {r′(c, d) ∈ Gr(r′(Y , Z)) | d ∈ C} be the set of ground rules of r′(Y , Z) corresponding to ground rule r(c). We 
just need to show that r(c) ≡s ∧ S(r(c)). Note that all rules in S(r(c)) only differ on A′(c, d), so we have that ∧ S(r(c)) is 
strongly equivalent to10
Head(c) ← Pos(c)∧ Neg(c)∧ Agg′(c)∧
∨
{ A′(c,d) | d ∈ C } (A.3)
Furthermore, from Lemma 8, we have that A and
∨{A′(c, d) | d ∈ C} are strongly equivalent. Then, replacing ∨{A′(c, d) | d ∈ C} by A in (A.3), we have that∧
S(r(c)) ≡s Head(c) ← Pos(c)∧ Neg(c)∧ Agg′(c)∧ A
Inductively applying this reasoning to all atoms in Agg′(c), we obtain that r(c) ≡s ∧ S(r(c)) holds and, thus, Gr(r(Y )) ≡s
Gr(r′(Y , Z)) follow. 
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